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Abstract—The access to privacy-sensitive information on An-
droid is a growing concern in the mobile community. Albeit
Google Play recently introduced some privacy guidelines, it is
still an open problem to soundly verify whether apps actually
comply with such rules. To this aim, in this paper, we discuss
a novel methodology based on a fruitful combination of static
analysis, dynamic analysis, and machine learning techniques,
which allows assessing such compliance. More in detail, our
methodology checks whether each app i) contains a privacy policy
that complies with the Google Play privacy guidelines, and ii)
accesses privacy-sensitive information only upon the acceptance
of the policy by the user. Furthermore, the methodology also
allows checking the compliance of third-party libraries embedded
in the apps w.r.t. the same privacy guidelines.
We implemented our methodology in a tool, 3PDroid, and we
carried out an assessment on a set of recent and most-downloaded
Android apps in the Google Play Store. Experimental results
suggest that more than 95% of apps access user’s privacy-
sensitive information, but just a negligible subset of them (≈ 1%)
fully complies with the Google Play privacy guidelines.
Index Terms—Android, Privacy Guidelines, Static Analysis,
Dynamic Analysis, Machine Learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to Statista1, the number of available Android
applications (hereafter, apps) was lowering in 2019, for the
first time. This fact suggests that the app market competition
is becoming more fierce, where a lot of apps drop from the
Google Play Store due to obsolescence or lack of interest
by the users’ community. In order to stay on top, apps need
to keep monitoring the users’ preferences and demands, by
continuously harvesting and gathering both user’s and device
information during their execution. Unfortunately, most of
such information are privacy-related (e.g., the user’s location
through GPS, the contact list, and the IMEI of the device), and
raised privacy concerns from both corporate and personal users
(see, e.g., [1], [2]). This is due to the recent discovery of severe
data breaches involving mobile apps, like the one discovered
in the Peekaboo Moments Android app which exposed more
than 100 GB of images and videos of babies2.
To deal with users’ privacy demand, mobile apps should
only access the minimum amount of personal and sensitive
information (hereafter, PSI) which could be sufficient to
1https://www.statista.com/statistics/266210/number-of-available-
applications-in-the-google-play-store/
2https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/babys-first-breach-app-exposes-baby-
photos-videos-a-13603
provide the service they are offering. Furthermore, they should
clearly state which PSI is accessed.
To try mitigating the privacy problem on the Android
platform, the Google Play Store released a detailed document
containing a set of privacy guidelines for Android apps [3].
This document contains the technical and legal requirements
concerning “the collection, use, and sharing of the data, and
limiting the use of the data to the purposes disclosed, and the
consent provided by the user”. As a consequence, all apps on
the Google Play Store that need to access PSI must have a
privacy policy to notify the user about how they collect, use,
share, and process such information. It is also mandatory that
this policy is hosted inside the app, and is prompted to (and
accepted by) the user before accessing any PSI.
Research challenge: Albeit the definition of a set of
privacy guidelines is an important step towards providing
privacy guarantees to Android users, a sound and complete
methodology to assess whether each app actually complies
with them is still missing. Furthermore, it is likewise unclear
how many apps actually comply with the Google Play privacy
guidelines.
A. State of the art
In 2018, Google carried out an extensive analysis in the
Google Play Store, thereby removing all apps that did not
have at least an external link to a valid privacy policy page on
their Google Play Store page. To prevent Google from deleting
their apps, several developers added such link, bringing the
percentage of apps that satisfies this requirement from 41.7%
in 2017 to 51.8% in 2018 [4]. However, no further checks
on the content of the privacy policy page have been carried
out, nor on the compliance between the privacy policy and the
actual behaviors of the app.
To deal with previous issues, Zimmeck et al. [5] carried
out an extensive analysis of 17.991 free Android apps on the
Google Play Store by leveraging static analysis and machine
learning techniques. The authors found that 71% of apps that
lack a privacy policy should have one, as they access PSI.
Also, for 9, 050 apps that have a privacy policy page, the
authors found a lot of potential inconsistencies between the
content of the policy page and the app behavior. Unfortunately,
since the authors relied on static analysis only, the actual
number of true positives cannot be verified. In [6], the authors
proposed a tool, named Mobile App Privacy System (MAPS),
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which is able to carry out a more extensive analysis of Android
apps. MAPS is based on a pipeline for retrieving and analyzing
large app populations based on code analysis and machine
learning techniques. MAPS analyzed 1, 035, 853 apps taken
from the Google Play Store, and found that only 50.5% of
them actually have a privacy policy page. In [7], the authors
propose PolicyLint, a privacy policy analysis tool able to
identify contradictions inside the privacy policy page. The
authors analyzed 11, 430 apps and found that 14.2% of the
privacy policies contain contradictions that may suggest the
presence of misleading statements.
Open challenges: We argue that previous proposals
suffer from some limitations. First, they rely on static analysis
techniques only, thereby making hard to identify actual true
positives. Moreover, they focus on the privacy policy page
published on the Google Play Store only, which may differ
from the one contained in the app and prompted to the user
at runtime. Furthermore, they are not able to i) identify the
privacy policy page inside the app, ii) verify whether such
page complies with the privacy guidelines of the Google Play
Store, iii) detect whether the app begins to access PSI before
the user explicitly accepts the privacy policy.
Previous challenges require to assess the behavior of the app
dynamically and are getting worse by the fact that recent apps
made extensive usage of third-party libraries and frameworks
[8], which boost the complexity in assessing the type of data
that is collected and processed by the app.
3PDroid: In this paper, we propose a novel methodology
to automatically verify the compliance of an Android app
with the privacy guidelines of the Google Play Store and we
implemented it in a tool, named 3PDroid3 This tool combines
static and dynamic analysis approaches with machine learning
techniques to monitor the runtime behavior of an Android app
in order to verify whether:
1) the app contains a privacy policy page;
2) the privacy policy page fully complies with the Google
Play privacy guidelines;
3) the app accesses PSI only after the user has accepted the
privacy policy;
4) the access to PSI - carried out by both the native app and
its included third-party libraries/frameworks - complies
with the app privacy policy.
Structure of the paper: The rest of the paper is organized
as follows: Section II introduces some basics on Android and
the Google Play privacy guidelines, while Section III presents
a methodology to automatically assess the compliance of
Android apps with the privacy guidelines. Section IV discusses
the implementation of the proposed methodology in 3PDroid,
as well as an experimental setup aimed at systematically
analyzing sets of Android apps. Section V shows and discusses
the experimental results, while Section VI concludes the paper
and points out some extension of the work.
3The tool and the results are available at https://csec.it/3pdroid.
II. BACKGROUND
Modern mobile devices gather a plethora of PSI, which
could refer to different categories, like financial and payment
data, authentication information, phonebook, contacts, SMS,
call-related data, microphone, and camera sensor data, just
to cite a few. Android apps extensively collect, store, and
process PSI in order to improve their quality and reliability, as
extensively discussed in [9]–[11]. From a technical standpoint,
apps can retrieve PSI either by i) relying on the Android
platform API or ii) embedding third-party libraries.
Android API and Permissions: The Android OS allows
apps to get access to PSI through a set of well-defined API.
At the same time, Android limits the access to PSI through
a security mechanism based on the idea of permission. In
a nutshell, each PSI-related API is associated with a set
of privacy-sensitive permissions. The invocation of an API
is then restricted to the sole apps having the required set
of permissions. Android apps must require permissions by
declaring them in their AndroidManifest.xml file in a specific
tag named uses-permission [12].
According to the type of permission, the OS might grant it
automatically or might prompt the user to approve the request.
For example, if an app aims to read data from the contact
list, it must declare the “android.permission.READ-
_CONTACTS” permission within the AndroidManifest.xml file
in order to be allowed to invoke the corresponding API (e.g.,
getPhoneNumbers). Then, the first time the app tries to
access the API, the user is prompted with a permission grant
request. If the user accepts, the app can invoke the API,
thereafter.
For the aim of this work, we mapped the standard permis-
sion set provided by the Android OS with the corresponding
API methods and the PSI. An excerpt of such mapping,
inspired by the works of [13] and [11], is provided in Table
I.
Permission PSI API method
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Device MAC getMacAddress()
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION GPS Location getLocation()
READ_PHONE_STATE IMEI getDeviceId()
READ_PHONE_STATE Phone Number getLine1Number()
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE Router MAC getMacAddress()
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE Router SSID getBSSID()
TABLE I: Mapping of Android permissions, PSI and API
methods.
Third-party Libraries: The previous mapping provides
only a partial coverage of the full PSI. In fact, there exists a
wide set of PSI that is beyond the control of the OS and,
therefore, it is outside the enforcement mechanisms of the
Android permissions. Examples of this PSI include all the
usage statistics like the commercial or usage preferences of
the user, collected for profiling aim, or to build crash reporting
activities. To collect this PSI, developers extensively include
in their apps third-party libraries for analytics and advertising
that can be triggered using a set of the API methods [14].
For instance, analytics libraries can retrieve and store several
pieces of PSI, including the country as well as the type and
the model of the mobile device. Most of these libraries can
also track the user’s activities. Furthermore, developers may
use Ad Network libraries to deliver application ads in order to
increase revenues. To this aim, the Ad Network library may
access PSI to show personalized ads customized to the taste
of the users. Notables examples of analytics and Ad Network
libraries include AdMob4, Google Analytics5, InMobi6, and
Facebook Analytics7.
In this work, we identified a set of the most used analytics
and Ad Network libraries according to [15], and we mapped
the API methods that involve the collection, process, and use
of PSI. An excerpt of such mapping, presenting a subset of
InMobi API methods, is presented in Table II.
API method PSI
setKeywords Keywords
setSearchString Keywords
setGender Gender
setCurrentLocation Location
setAge Age
setRequestParams Multiple Factors
setPostalCode Postal Code
setLocationInquiryAllowed Enable Location
setIncome Income
setInterests Interests
setAreaCode Area Code
setEducation Education
setEthinicity Ethnicity
TABLE II: Examples of API methods extracted from the
InMobi library and their mapping with PSI.
A. The Google Play Privacy Guidelines
The growing concerns on PSI pushed Google Play to release
a “Privacy, Security and Deception” guideline document [3] to
grant transparency on the access and usage of PSI by Android
apps. Such guidelines force each developer to restrict the
collection and the use of sensitive data only for aims directly
related to the supply and improvement of the functionality
of the app. Furthermore, the developer must handle all of
these pieces of data safely and transmit them using modern
encryption mechanisms (i.e., via HTTPS).
Still, in case PSI are gathered at runtime, the app must
provide an in-app disclosure regarding data collection and
usage, i.e., a privacy policy page. Such page must meet a set
of technical (TR) and content (CR) requirements, as detailed
in Table III, in order to be compliant with the guidelines.
In a nutshell, the application must include the policy within
the app, and prompt it to the user without requiring her to
open a menu or the settings. Moreover, the app must require
the explicit consent of the user, e.g., by avoiding timeout or
automatic acceptance actions. Finally, the privacy policy page
4https://admob.google.com/intl/it/home/
5ttps://firebase.google.com/docs/analytics
6https://www.inmobi.com/
7ttps://analytics.facebook.com/
must precisely describe both the set of collected PSI and for
which aim. At the same time, the app must not collect PSI
before obtaining the user’s consent.
Id Description
CR1
The privacy policy page must clearly state the set of PSI it
collects, as well as how the same PSI will be used.
CR2
The privacy policy page must be prompted to the user in a proper
document, which is different from the terms of service or other
documents that do not deal with personal or sensitive information.
TR1
The privacy policy page must be stored within the app, i.e., it is
not sufficient to store it on a website or on the app page in the
Google Play Store.
TR2
The privacy policy page must be shown during the execution of
the app once and automatically prompted, i.e., the user must not
search for it in a menu or a settings page.
TR3
The user must explicitly accept the privacy policy, e.g., it must
click on an acceptance widget.
TR4
The app must not collect PSI before the user accepts the privacy
policy.
TR5
The app must not consider the privacy policy as accepted if the
user leaves the privacy policy page by pressing the home or back
button.
TR6
Once prompted, the privacy policy page must not expire before
the user could accept it.
TABLE III: Technical (TR) and content (CR) requirements of
the Google Play privacy guidelines.
III. ASSESSING THE PRIVACY GUIDELINES COMPLIANCE
We discuss here a novel methodology based on a combina-
tion of static analysis, dynamic analysis, and machine learning
techniques to address the open research challenges described
at the end of Section I. This methodology can be applied to
any Android application package without requiring the source
code nor any additional information, and it is composed of 7
different modules that cooperate according to the workflow
sketched in Figure 1. The rest of this section details the
modules and their interactions.
A. PSI Mapping
The PSI Mapping contains the API methods belonging to
both the Android OS and the third-party libraries that are
relevant for the analysis, i.e., that collect, use, or process
PSI. In detail, the PSI Mapping contains the mapping of all
the privacy-related Android permissions (see Table I) and the
third-party libraries (see Table II) with their corresponding
PSI-related API methods.
B. App Analyzer
The App Analyzer decompiles an Android application pack-
age (APK) and extracts i) the list of permissions requested
by the app and ii) the list of third-party libraries included
in the app. For each finding, the module queries the PSI
Mapping to determine if the permission or the library is
privacy-sensitive. If this is the case, it requests the PSI and
the corresponding list of API methods that are involved. Then,
Fig. 1: Analysis Workflow.
the App Analyzer dispatches the list of PSI to the Content
Requirement Checker (CR Checker) and the list of involved
API methods to the Privacy API Monitor (PAPI Monitor).
Finally, the module triggers the Dynamic Testing Environment
(DTE) for the dynamic analysis phase. Instead, if the app
does not contain any privacy-related permission or library, it
is marked as compliant and no further analyzed.
C. Dynamic Testing Environment
The Dynamic Testing Environment (DTE) is the module
in charge of the installation and the execution of the app
inside a device emulator. First, the DTE initializes an Android
emulated device and installs the APK. Then, the module
executes the app, and notifies both the PAPI Monitor and
the Privacy Policy Page Detector (3P Detector) to start the
analysis.
D. Privacy Policy Page Detector (3P Detector)
The goal of the Privacy Policy Page Detector (3P Detector)
module is to identify the privacy policy page screen inside the
Android app. First, the 3P Detector connects to the DTE and
searches for the privacy policy page.
Following the algorithm depicted in Algorithm 1, the mod-
ule retrieves the XML content of the app screen which is
currently displayed to the user (row 5). Then, the module aims
to determine whether the textual content of the extracted page
includes a privacy policy (row 6-8). To do so, the 3P Detector
enforces a text classification algorithm based on machine
learning techniques. The classification procedure requires two
phases, namely preprocessing and classification.
Preprocessing: At first, the preprocessing extracts the
text content (row 6) from the XML of the page. Then,
the extracted text is polished to normalize whitespace and
punctuation, remove non-ASCII characters, and lowercase all
the content (row 7).
Classification: The preprocessed text is then evaluated to
determine if it contains a privacy policy page. For such a task,
3P Detector relies on a multilayer perceptron classifier (row
8). If the classifier marks the text as a privacy policy, the 3P
Detector sets the flag detected and exits the research loop.
Otherwise, the module sends an input to the app (e.g., a swipe
or a press command) in order to evaluate a new screen at the
next iteration (row 12-13). Also, 3P Detector stores a list of the
input actions (row 14) used to reach the privacy policy page.
This information will be sent to the Technical Requirement
Tester to evaluate the list of TRs (see Table III). Finally, if the
module successfully detects the policy page, it returns the text
of the policy, the XML file, and the list of actions required
to reach the page (row 18). On the contrary, if the module
cannot find the policy page within a maximum limit of input
actions (i.e., MA ), the app is marked as not compliant, and
the analysis terminates. Indeed, since apps must satisfy TR2,
the module expects to reach the policy page within such a
threshold.
Algorithm 1: 3P Detector
Input : Emulator, MA
Output: textContent, PPPXml, listActions
Output: TR1-TR2 Evaluation
1 listActions ← makeList ();
2 detected ← False;
3 emulator.startAPK ();
4 while not detected and listActions.len () < MA do
5 xmlContent ← emulator.getPageContent ();
6 textContent ← extractFromXML (xmlContent);
7 preprText ← dataPreprocessing (textContent);
8 detected ← MLPClassifier.isPolicyPage (preprText);
9 if detected then
10 break;
11 end
12 nextAction ← getNextAction (pageContent);
13 emulator.performAction (nextAction);
14 listActions.add (nextAction);
15 end
16 if detected then
17 PPPXml ← xmlContent;
18 return textContent, PPPXml, listActions;
19 end
20 return Fail_TR1_TR2;
E. Privacy API Monitor (PAPI Monitor)
This module verifies whether the app does invoke any PSI-
related API before the user explicitly accepts the privacy policy
page. Once it receives the start notification from the DTE, the
Privacy API Monitor connects to the testing environment and
begins to monitor the execution of any of the PSI-related API
method received from the App Analyzer. If the module logs
any of these methods, then the app does not fulfill the TR4
rule, and thus it is marked as not compliant.
F. Technical Requirement (TR) Tester
The aim of the Technical Requirement (TR) Tester module
is to identify whether the privacy policy page satisfies the
technical requirements described in Section II-A. To do that,
the TR Tester implements Algorithm 2.
First, the module evaluates the TR3 requirement by ana-
lyzing the XML of the page to detect any element allow-
ing the user to accept the policy explicitly (e.g., a button
or a checkbox); if no match is found, the app is marked
as not compliant, and the evaluation terminates (rows 1-3).
Otherwise, the module checks if the page expires or closes
automatically within a given threshold (row 4), in order to
verify the TR6 requirement. If the policy page is still displayed
when the threshold is reached, the module then proceeds with
the evaluation of the TR5 requirement. To this aim, it triggers
the home button and then re-opens the app (rows 8-10): if
the app screen is different from the privacy policy page, then
the app considers leaving the policy windows as an act of
acceptance, and thus it is marked as not compliant (row 14-
15). The experiment is repeated with the back button (rows
11-13).
Algorithm 2: TR Tester
Input : Emulator, PPPXml, listActions
Output: TR3, TR5, TR6 Evaluation
1 if not PPPXml.containsExplAccept () then
2 return Fail_TR3;
3 end
4 wait(timeout);
5 if emulator.getPageContent () != PPPXml then
6 return Fail_TR6;
7 end
8 emulator.pressHomeButton();
9 emulator.startAPK();
10 pageHomeButton← emulator.getPageContent();
11 emulator.pressBackButton();
12 emulator.startAppWithPrivacyPolicyPage();
13 pageBackButton← emulator.getPageContent();
14 if pageBackButton != PPPXml or pageHomeButton != PPPXml
then
15 return Fail_TR5;
16 end
17 return Pass;
G. Content Requirement (CR) Checker
The Content Requirement (CR) Checker verifies whether the
privacy policy page successfully declares all PSI requested by
the app, following the CR1 requirement. Given the list of PSI
received by the App Analyzer, the module executes several
machine learning-based classifiers.
For this task, CR Checker identifies for each PSI the
most meaningful keywords and creates two distinct sets, as
suggested in [5]. The first one is used to preprocess the policy
text and extract all the sentences that contain at least one of
the keywords associated with the data type of the PSI under
investigation (e.g., for the location PSI, we use terms like
‘position’ or ‘GPS’). On the resulting sentences, CR Checker
uses a second set of keywords that refer to the actions available
for a given PSI (e.g., for the location PSI, we use terms like
‘share’ or ‘partner’), to construct unigram and bigram feature
vectors [16].
The feature vectors are then used to classify the policy. CR
Checker uses a set of machine learning models (one for each
PSI, see Table IV) to determine whether all the pieces of PSI
are included in the policy. If this is not the case, the module
raises a warning regarding the CR1 requirement. In this case,
the app must pass through a manual inspection phase.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
We implemented a prototype of our methodology, called
3PDroid, to evaluate both the detection accuracy and the per-
formance on a dataset of Android apps. The rest of this section
describes the implementation choices and the corresponding
experimental setup.
App Analyzer: 3PDroid implements the App Analyzer as
a Python script based on the Androguard library8. Androguard
makes available several APIs allowing to parse the Android-
Manifest.xml file and retrieve all the privacy-related libraries.
Furthermore, the App Analyzer queries the PSI Mapping DB
to build the list of API to be monitored during the dynamic
analysis phase.
PSI Mapping: The PSI Mapping is a MongoDB database
storing the mappings among PSI, API Methods, Android
permissions, and third-party libraries. This dataset has been
built by parsing the Android API reference website9 as well
as the websites and the documentation provided by third-party
developers. The dataset is composed of a set of JSON object
documents. The current version of the PSI Mapping includes
the most used libraries according to [17], like, e.g., AdMob
and Google Analytics.
The first column of Table IV shows all PSI taken into
consideration in this work and inspired by [4]. It is worth
noticing that a privacy policy page could combine both coarse-
grained (e.g., “contact_information”) and fine-grained
(e.g. “contact_email_address”) PSI.
Dynamic Testing Environment: The app is executed
on an emulated x8610 device based on Android 6.0 with
root permissions, and equipped with Frida, a dynamic code
instrumentation toolkit11. The DTE module is attached to
the emulator and orchestrates the installation, execution, and
stimulation of the app under test by leveraging the Android
Debug Bridge (ADB)12. The Privacy API Monitor relies
on Frida to instrument the app at runtime. This module is
configured to log only the privacy-related API identified by
8https://androguard.readthedocs.io/
9https://developer.android.com/reference/packages?hl=en
10https://www.android-x86.org/
11https://frida.re/docs/home/
12https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb
CR Checker task Model Best Parameters P A R
contact address RF entropy, log2, 1000 85% 85% 85%
contact city RF entropy, log2, 100 73% 73% 73%
contact email address SVM 1, 0.1, rbf 77% 77% 77%
contact information SVM 0.1, linear 82% 82% 82%
contact password RF entropy, auto, 100 83% 83% 83%
contact phone number LR 5, 20, l2, 10, lbfgs 78% 78% 78%
contact postal MNB 0.5, True 80% 80% 80%
contact zip AB SAMME, 500 81% 81% 81%
demographic age RF gini, auto, 50 83% 83% 83%
demographic gender AB SAMME.R, 265 78% 78% 78%
demographic information RF gini, auto, 150 82% 82% 82%
identifier ad id RF entropy, auto, 10 83% 83% 83%
identifier cookie SVM 1, 1, rbf 88% 88% 88%
identifier device RF gini, auto, 50 79% 79% 79%
identifier imei RF entropy, log2, 50 91% 91% 91%
identifier imsi RF gini, auto, 5 100% 100% 100%
identifier information RF gini, log2, 10 79% 79% 79%
identifier ip address RF entropy, log2, 1000 73% 73% 73%
identifier mac RF gini, auto, 50 88% 88% 88%
identifier sim serial MNB 1.5, True 100% 100% 100%
identifier SSID BSSID RF gini, auto, 50 92% 92% 92%
location bluetooth RF entropy, log2, 10 83% 83% 83%
location cell tower RF gini, auto, 100 87% 87% 87%
location gps RF gini, log2, 300 82% 82% 82%
location information SVM 0.01, linear 73% 73% 73%
location ip address MNB 0.5, False 78% 78% 78%
location wifi RF entropy, auto, 25 82% 82% 82%
performed not performed RF gini, auto, 500 96% 96% 96%
third party first party RF gini, log2, 300 98% 98% 98%
TABLE IV: CR Checker tasks: model parameters and evalua-
tion in terms of precision (P), accuracy (A), and recall (R).
the App Analyzer, and to analyze an app for ten minutes at
most.
Privacy Policy Page (3P) Detector: The 3P Detector
stimulates the app using the DTE module and extracts the
XML of the app screens using the UI Automator tool13. Then,
the module pre-processes the policy text using the NLTK14
libraries, and relies on a multilayer perceptron (MLP) based
text classifier based on the TensorFlow library [18] to identify
the policy page. The MLP is composed of two hidden layers
made by 64 perceptrons each. The activation function of the
output layer is a sigmoid function, and the loss function used to
train the model is a binary cross-entropy function. Moreover,
we set the learning rate to 0.0001, the number of epochs to
1000, a batch size to 128, and a dropout rate to 0.2 in order
to prevent overfitting.
We leveraged the APP-350 [6] and a subset of the
News Summary15 datasets - labeled as “policy” and
“not_policy” respectively - as a basis to build a new
dataset for training and validating the MLP model. Then, we
carried out the following operations on this dataset: i) we
tokenized the documents in n-grams (with n = 1 and n = 2),
ii) we computed the importance of each n-gram using the
tf−idf function [19] and iii) we selected the best 20k n-grams
based on the ANOVA F-value [20] statistical test.
The output of the MLP model is a probability score that
indicates the likelihood that the analyzed privacy page belongs
to the “policy” class. We defined a confidence threshold
13https://developer.android.com/training/testing/ui-automator
14https://www.nltk.org/
15https://github.com/sunnysai12345/News Summary
to 90%, i.e., the page is classified as “not_policy” if the
score is less than the threshold; otherwise, it is classified
as “policy”. We selected a high threshold in order to
automatically discard all text pages which may resemble a
privacy policy page (e.g., the “Terms & Conditions” pages),
thereby reducing the likelihood of false positives.
Technical Requirement (TR) Tester: The TR Tester
interacts with the emulator using the DTE module and the
UI Automator tool to evaluate the compliance of the privacy
policy page w.r.t. the list of TRs (Table III). As described in
Section III, we defined a maximum number of 20 actions to
check the compliance with TR2, and we set a timeout of 10
seconds for TR6.
Content Requirement (CR) Checker: The CR Checker
analyzes each sentence in a privacy policy page with the aim
to i) identify the set of PSI therein, ii) check whether the
sentence is affirmative or not (e.g., “We access your contacts”
or “We do not access your contacts”), and iii) verify if the
PSI is accessed by third-party libraries. The CR Checker pre-
processes the privacy policy page by splitting it into sentences
using the NLTK libraries. Following the same approach of 3P
Detector, the sentences are thus tokenized in n-grams (n=1
and n=2). Then, the tf − idf function is applied to evaluate
the importance of each n-gram. Moreover, the CR Checker
leverages 27 ML models to identify the PSI in the sentence
(i.e., one for each PSI). Finally, the CR Checker leverages
two ad hoc binary classifiers, i.e., performed not performed
and third party first party, to identify whether i) a sentence
is affirmative, and ii) the third-party libraries access PSI,
respectively.
We selected and tested a set of ML algorithms (i.e., Multi-
nomialNB, RandomForest, SVM, kNN, LogisticRegression,
DecisionTree, and AdaBoost) in order to find the best model
for each CR Checker task. In addition, we carried out a hy-
perparameters optimization phase using a grid search strategy
(i.e., exhaustive searching strategy) to find the best parameters
for all ML algorithms; the tested parameters are summarized
in Table V.
ML Algorithm Parameters
MultinomialNB (MNB) alpha, fit prior
RandomForest (RF) critierion, max features, n estimators
Support Vector Machine (SVM) C, gamma, kernel
Logistic Regression (LR) max iter, penalty, solver
k-Nearest Neighbors (kNN) n neighbors, weights, algorithm
Decision Tree (DT) criterion, splitter
AdaBoost (AB) algorithm, estimators
TABLE V: ML algorithms and their tested parameters.
The set of the best parameters for each model, as well as the
evaluation of the models in terms of precision (P), accuracy
(A), and recall (R), are reported in Table IV.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We empirically assessed the reliability of the proposed
methodology by systematically analyzing a dataset of 5, 473
apps with 3PDroid. Such apps are the top free Android apps
ranked by the number of installations and average ratings
according to Androidrank [21], and have been downloaded
from the Google Play Store between Dec. 2019 and Jan. 2020.
It is worth noticing that 4, 567 apps (i.e., ≈ 84.4%) have a
valid link to a privacy policy page on the Google Play Store.
Our experiments were conducted using a laptop equipped with
an Intel Core i7-3770@3.40 GHz, 16GB RAM, and Ubuntu
18.04.
A. Overview of Apps
3PDroid allowed categorizing the dataset according to the
privacy-sensitive permissions and the usage of third-party
libraries for accessing PSI.
The distribution of the privacy-relevant permissions in the
app dataset is shown in Table VI. The most requested privacy-
sensitive permission is ACCESS_WIFI_STATE which allows
accessing information about Wi-Fi networks and enables the
extraction of tracking details about the users as explained
in [22]. Other widely-used permissions include ACCESS_-
FINE_LOCATION and ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION that
enable the access to GPS location and READ_PHONE_STATE
that gives access to the phone state, including the phone
number and information on the cellular network. A complete
description of all Android permissions, including those listed
in Table VI, can be found in [12].
Permission Percentage Ratio
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE 47.1% 2579/5473
READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 45.7% 2503/5473
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION 22.8% 1250/5473
READ_PHONE_STATE 22.5% 1233/5473
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION 21.4% 1157/5473
CAMERA 18.8% 1031/5473
GET_ACCOUNTS 17.2% 942/5473
RECORD_AUDIO 11.1% 606/5473
READ_CONTACTS 9.5% 518/5473
CALL_PHONE 3.9% 212/5473
READ_CALENDAR 2.0% 111/5473
READ_SMS 0.8% 43/5473
RECEIVE_SMS 0.8% 42/5473
READ_CALL_LOG 0.7% 38/5473
TABLE VI: Distribution of privacy-related permissions in the
experimental dataset.
The distribution of third-party libraries for analytics and
advertising is shown in Table VII. It is important to emphasize
that a single PSI can be shared with one or more third-party
libraries, as an app can import any number of third-party
libraries. It is also worth pointing out that the most widespread
libraries belong to Google (i.e., Google Ads, Google Fire-
base Analytics, Google DoubleClick, Google CrashLytics, and
Google Analytics) and Facebook (i.e., Facebook Ads and
Facebook Analytics).
B. Success Rate and Performance Analysis
3PDroid was able to analyze 92.4% of apps (i.e.,
5057/5473) successfully. The analysis of the remaining 416
apps failed due to one of the following reasons:
Library Name Percentage Ratio
Google Ads 82.8% 4534/5473
Google Firebase Analytics 63.1% 3454/5473
Google DoubleClick 55.6% 3044/5473
Google CrashLytics 40.2% 2201/5473
Facebook Ads 29.3% 1605/5473
Google Analytics 28.8% 1581/5473
Facebook Analytics 26.9% 1472/5473
Unity3d Ads 21.1% 1156/5473
Moat 18.9% 1036/5473
Flurry 16.3% 894/5473
Inmobo 15.9% 869/5473
AppLovin 14.8% 810/5473
Twitter MoPup 14.3% 783/5473
Vungle 12.9% 711/5473
Integral Ad Science 11.7% 640/5473
AdColony 11.5% 627/5473
TABLE VII: Distribution of third-party libraries for advertis-
ing and analytics.
• Technical. The dynamic analysis of 3PDroid is based
on an Android with root permissions, and mounted on
an emulated x86 architecture equipped with the Houdini
ARM translator library. However, some apps did not
execute in an emulator or on a rooted device. Other apps
failed due to compatibility issues related to the Houdini
library.
• Geographical. Some apps (e.g., banking) executes only
in specific locales.
Concerning performance, 3PDroid took 413 hours for ana-
lyzing all the apps (i.e., 5473), with a mean of 272 seconds
for each app, on a mid-level laptop, thereby suggesting that
the approach is viable. Further optimizations like porting the
3PDroid approach on some Cloud IaS could be an interesting
technical deployment to delve further that could consequently
allow increasing the current thresholds for the dynamic anal-
ysis.
C. Analysis Results
The results obtained by 3PDroid are depicted in Fig. 2 and
indicate that only 5.5% of the analyzed apps (i.e., 279/5057)
are compliant with the Google Play privacy guidelines.
Among these, 4.6% (i.e., 233/5057) are clean apps, i.e.,
apps that do not access any PSI, and thus do not require a
privacy policy.
It is worth pointing out how such a value suggests that only
a minimal set of the current apps do not access any personal
information.
The remaining 0.9% (i.e., 46/5057) are apps that actually
provides a privacy policy page that fulfills the Google Play
privacy guidelines.
The amount of non-compliant apps is worrisome (94.5%,
4778/5057), and suggests that the privacy problem could be
more severe than foreseen in previous work. Furthermore, it
is worth recalling that the vast majority of such apps have a
valid link to a privacy policy page on the Google Play Store.
A more detailed analysis of this set shows that most of the
apps (82.1%, 4150/5057) lack an internal privacy policy page
Fig. 2: Overview of 3PDroid Results on 5057 apps.
- although they get access to PSI - and thus, they do not fulfill
the TR1 and TR2 requirements. The remaining apps (12.4%,
628/5057) do not fulfill either TR3-TR6 or CR1. It is worth
pointing out that the analysis process is sequential and the
TRs are evaluated before CR1. As a consequence, all apps
that are tested against CR1 have been previously recognized
as TR3-TR6 compliant, also.
Concerning TRs, 292 apps collect PSI before an explicit
acceptance of the privacy policy (TR4), while 228 assume
that the user implicitly accepts the policy by leaving the
privacy policy page (TR5). Moreover, 54 apps do not require
an explicit acceptance from the user (TR3), while 6 of them
have a self-expiring privacy policy page (TR6). Concerning
the CRs, 22 apps provide just a partial description of the PSI
they collect during normal execution (i.e., CR1 PSI), while
10 apps do not warn the user about the usage of PSI-related
third-party libraries (i.e., CR1 third-party). Finally, 16 apps do
not fulfill any of the previous requirements (i.e., CR1 PSI &
third-party).
D. Manual Validation of 3PDroid
We manually analyzed some subsets of apps, in order to as-
sess the reliability of the machine learning-based components
(i.e., 3P Detector and CR Checker) of 3PDroid.
Regarding 3P Detector, we manually analyzed a set of
1348/5057 apps (i.e., ≈ 26.6%) made by two subsets. The first
subset contains all 674 apps in which 3P Detector recognized
an internal privacy policy page. The latter is made by other
624 apps randomly selected among the remaining ones (i.e.,
without a detected privacy policy page). Regarding the first
subset, the manual analysis showed that 648 apps are actually
policy pages (true positive - TP), while the remaining 26
hosted a different kind of page (false positive - FP). Regarding
the second subset, we found that 656 apps actually lack
a privacy-related content (true negative - TN), while the
remaining 18 apps have an undetected privacy policy page
(false negatives - FN).
Concerning CR Checker, we took into consideration the
94 apps, which fulfilled all TRs. We manually analyzed all
sentences (i.e., 2961) contained in their privacy policy pages.
CR Checker recognized 52/94 apps as CR1 (PSI) compliant,
and 64/94 as CR1 (third-party) compliant. Regarding CR1
(PSI), our manual analysis revealed that: i) 48/52 are actually
compliant (TP), while 4/52 are not (FP). Furthermore, 28/42
are indeed not compliant with CR1 (PSI) (TN), while 14/42
revealed to be compliant (FN). Regarding CR1 (third-party),
we found that 63/64 are TPs (and 1/64 is a FP), while 24/30
are TNs (and 6/30 are FNs). The results of the previous
analysis indicate that the adopted classifiers have a good level
of performance in terms of accuracy, sensitivity, specificity,
and precision, as summarized in Table VIII.
Metric Model Percentage Ratio
Accuracy TP+TNTP+TN+FP+FN
3P Detector 96.7% 1304/1348
CR1 (PSI) 80.9% 76/94
CR1 (third-party) 92.6% 87/96
Sensitivity TPTP+FN
3P Detector 97.3% 648/666
CR1 (PSI) 77.4% 48/62
CR1 (third-party) 91.3% 63/69
Specificity TNTN+FP
3P Detector 96.2% 656/682
CR1 (PSI) 87.5% 28/32
CR1 (third-party) 96.0% 24/25
Precision TPTP+FP
3P Detector 96.1% 648/674
CR1 (PSI) 92.3% 48/52
CR1 (third-party) 98.4% 63/64
TABLE VIII: Performance of ML-based analysis in 3PDroid.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced the first methodology which
allows assessing the compliance of Android apps with the
recently released Google Play privacy guidelines at runtime.
Our approach can be combined with the previous proposals
based on static analysis, in order to build more reliable analysis
workflows for evaluating the access to PSI by Android apps.
Our results suggest that the vast majority of actual Android
apps (i.e., 95.4% of the analyzed apps) access PSI, but just a
negligible part of them (i.e., ≈ 1%) fully complies with the
Google Play privacy guidelines.
Future extensions of this work could be i) an extensive
empirical assessment of the methodology in the wild, by
analyzing a higher number of Android apps, ii) the evaluation
of other machine learning techniques for the detection of the
privacy policy page and the classification of its contents, in
order to further improve the precision, the recall, and the
accuracy of the analysis, iii) extend the number of supported
third-party libraries.
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